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CIRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
ORVILL C. SNYDER*
"R ESPONSIBILITY" is frequently used as a synonym for "li-
ability." Yet in the criminal law it dearly appears that responsi-
bility and liability are not the same. With this, the criminal lawyer
has somehow to deal. Whatever he does, he will be faced with the
question: What must there be for there to be responsibility? Answer-
ing requires resort to first principles.
THE FACTUAL BAsis oF LIABILITY
Liability is imposed by law. There is no liability unless a law is
enacted imposing it. But law does not impose liability out of the blue.
Whether civil or criminal, there is a factual basis for imposing it; and
the factual bases of civil and criminal liability have common elements.
These are harm,' conduct, and causal relation between the conduct and
the harm. At its minimum, conduct is voluntary outward bodily motion.
Liability is not imposed for harm caused by involuntary motion.2 The
teacher of criminal law covers this in his treatment of the overt act and
proximate causation.
II
RESPONSIBILITY
Where liability is imposed, voluntary motion, causal relation, and
harm are always present. Absolute or strict liability is imposed on the
basis of these three elements alone. Hence, in the primary sense that
responsibility is the basis of liability, voluntary motion causing harm is
responsibility.
* LL.B. 5928, LL.M. 1934, Columbus College of Law, LL.M. 1937, Northwestern
University. Member of Ohio Bar. Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Con-
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'It is "harm that puts the law into motion." Koaousx, JURAL RELATIONS 263
(2d ed. 1927).
' Of course, liability may be imposed for omissions as well.
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III
CRIMINAL RESPONSIILITY
Though voluntary motion, causal relation, and harm are essential,
these three elements alone are not enough for imposing criminal i-
ability; there must be more. This necessary further element is mens
rea or criminal intent, and it is the key to the question of criminal re-
sponsibility. The principal explorations of criminal responsibility have
been made in connection with the plea of insanity, and the tests evoked
by this plea all involve mens rea. As was pointed out almost a century
ago, when the issue of responsibility is raised in a criminal case, the "real
ultimate question to be determined seems to be, whether, at the time
of the act, he [the accused] had the mental capacity to entertain a
criminal intent-whether, in point of fact, he did entertain such in-
tent."' Thus, it appears that the essentials of mens rea and of criminal
responsibility are the same.
A. What are the Essentials of Criminal Responsibility?
Inquiry can be begun by asking: Why is the factual basis of absolute
liability not enough to establish criminal responsibility? The answer
is that the causal motion must be more than merely voluntary; it must
at least be made negligently; but since negligence is generally con-
sidered insufficient, the motion must be made recklessly or with in-
tention to cause the resulting harm.' This is best illustrated by a con-
sideration of the effect of mental disease upon criminal responsibility.
' "The whole relationship of psychiatry to the law is highlighted by the development
of the insanity plea." WERTHAM, THE SHOW OF VIOLENCE 8 (1951).
' State v. Jones, 5o N.H. 369, 382 (1871). Accord, Durham v. United States, 214
F.zd 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954), Holloway v. United States, 148 F.zd 665, 666
n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1945) Reeves v. State, 196 Ga. 604, 27 S.E.2d 375, 381-82 (1943);
Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 501-02 (1844) 5 People v. Garbutt,
17 Mich. 9, 2o-21 (1868) ; State v. Cumberworth, 69 Ohio App. 239, 43 N.E.2d 510,
512-13 (1942)s State v. Strasburg, 6o Wash. io6, iio Pac. o2o, 1024 (1910);
CLARK & MARSHALL, THE LAW OF CRIMES 336 (1958) ; HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF CRIMINAL LAW 449 (zd ed. 196o) ; MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW 125 (1934) j -4 AM.
JUR. Criminal Law § 30 (1938); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 55 (1961); Annot., 45
A.L.R.2d 1447, 1449 n.8, 1450 (x956) j Keedy, Insanity and Criminal Responsibility,
3o HARv. L. REV. 535, 536 (1917) ; Mueller, Criminal Law and 4ministration, 34
N.Y.U.L. REv. 83, 84 (1959).
'HALL, STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND CRIMINAL THEORY 271-72 (1958);
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 663-71 (1957); SNYDER, AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 138-49 (-95-3)-
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Mental disease or defect does not of itself negate criminal responsi-
bility unless the disease or defect affects the actor's mind in a certain
way.' After adverting to the tests of this qualification-M'Naghten,
irresistible impulse, Durham, and the Model Penal Code-one can
conclude that if because of mental disease or defect the actor does not
know what he is doing (i.e., the nature and quality of his act, sufficiently
indicated by the hyperbolic example of a man thinking he is squeezing
lemons when he is choking his wife), or if he acts from irresistible
impulse, or if his act is the product of mental disease or defect, or if he
is unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, he is deemed
not to be criminally responsible. Why? Because he is deemed not to
will to do what he does. Another question is: Why is it thought that
the actor is not criminally responsible, if he, though knowing what he
is doing, does not, -because of mental disease or defect, know that it is
wrong? One answer is that it is thought that he does not will to do
what he does.7
The results of the foregoing inquiry can be summarized at this point,
as follows: In any case, for the actor to be criminally responsible, he
must will to do what he does; and to do that, he must know what he is
doing. Moreover, it appears to be undisputed that if the actor knows
what he is doing, knows that it is wrong, and wills to do it, he is crim-
inally responsible.8 One then can ask: If a man knows what he is
ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949-1953, REPORT para. z8o at
99 (xgs3).
"State v. Mowry, 37 Kan. 369, i5 Pac. 282, 284-85 (1887); State v. Pike, 49
N.H. 399, 437 (1870); State v. White, 58 N.M. 3241 270 P.2d 727, 729 (1954) ;
State v.'Harri, 223 N.C. 697, 28 S.E.2d 232, 238 (19 .3) ; State v. Cumberworth, 69
Ohio App. 239, 43 N.E,2d 5io, 512-13 (1942); State v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729,
15 S.E. 982, 986 (1892); 2 STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
167, 171 (1883). The M'Naghten theory is that a mental disease or defect which
renders the actor incapable of knowing that what he is doing is wrong incapacitates him
to will to do it; and that mental disease or defect that does not incapacitate him to
know that it is wrong does not incapacitate him to will to do it. The irresistible-impulses
theory is that a mental disease or defect which either does or does not incapacitate the
actor to know that what he is doing is wrong can incapacitate him to will to do it.
Snyder, Who is Wrong about the M'Naghten Rule and Who Cares?, 23 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 1, 4 (.956).
fDurham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. x954); Holloway v.
United States, 148 F.zd 665, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Smith v. United States, 36
F.2d 548, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1929); Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 857-59
(1887) ; Reeves v. State, x96 Ga. 604, 27 S.E.2d 375, 381-82 (1943); State v. Mowry,
37 Kan. 369, 15 Pac. 282, 284-85 (1887); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7
Met.) o, 5o-o2 (1844) ; Knights v. State, 58 Neb. 225, 78 N.W. 508, 509 (1899);
State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 270 P.ad 727, 729 (1954); State v. Cumberworth, 69
[Vol. t96z: 204
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doing, but because of mental disease or defect does not know it is
wrong, is it possible that he can still will to do it. The answer appears
to be that he can-which brings up a more difficult question.
If the actor knows what he is doing and wills to do it, but because
of mental disease or defect does not know it is wrong, is he criminally
responsible? Two answers are made. By one view, the actor is re-
sponsible. The only import of his knowledge or want of knowledge
that the act is wrong is its bearing, if any, on whether the actor wills
to do what he does.' The other position is that in addition to his
knowing what he is doing and willing to do it, the actor must know his
act is wrong. Under this latter view, causation is essential to criminal
responsibility, and volition is essential to causation; but causational voli-
tion is not all that is essential to criminal responsibility. In addition, the
actor's will must be a vicious will, his intent an evil intent, and, for his
will to be vicious, his intent evil, he must not only will to do what he
knows he is doing, but also know that what he is doing is wrong."
Ohio App. 239, 43 N.E.2d 510, 512-13 (1942); State v. Strasburg, 6o Wash. io6, iio
Pac. 1020, 1025 (91o) ; State v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729, 15 S.E. 982, 986 (1892)
2 STEPHEN, op. Cit. supra note 7, at 183.
'State v. Strasburg, 6o Wash. io6, 21o Pac. io2o, 1027 (igio); cf. Durham
v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ; Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577,
2 So. 854, 857-59 (1887). It may be possible that a man who knows what he is doing
and knows that it is wrong can will to do it. Also it may be possible that a man who
knows what he is doing but does not, because of mental disease or defect, know that it
is wrong cannot will to do it. But it is not certain that a man who knows what he
is doing, but because of mental disease or defect, does not know that it is wrong cannot,
nevertheless, will to do it. Though it has repeatedly been said that M'Naghten is a
volition test, there has always surrounded the rule the notion that it is possible for a
man to know what he is doing but not to know, because of mental disease or defect,
that it is wrong to will to do it. State v. Nixon, 32 Kan. 205, 4. Pac. 159, 163 (1884-) ;
Knights v. State, 58 Neb. 225, 78 N.W. 5o8, 509 (1899) ; Flanagan v. People, 52 N.Y.
467, 4-70 (1873). See note 23 infra and text.
"0State v. Strasburg, 6o Wash. zo6, xo Pac. o2o, 1027 (igo); cf. Parsons v.
State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 857-59 (1887) ; State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 270 P.2d
727, 729 (1954) ; State v. Harris, 223 N.C. 697, 28 S.E.2d 232, 238 (943).
" Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952) ; United States v. Dot-
terweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) ; Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 498 (1943) ;
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. x954 ) ; Smith v. United States,
36 F.2d 548, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1929) ; Reeves v. State, 196 Ga. 604, 27 S.E.2d 375, 381-
82 (1943) ; State v. Nixon, 32 Kan. 205, 4 Pac. x59, z63 (i884) ; Commonwealth v.
Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 501-02 (1844); Knights v. State, 58 Neb. 225, 78
N.W. 508, 509 (x899); Flanagan v. People, 5z N.Y. 467, 470 (1873); State v.
Brandon, 53 N.C. 463, 467 (1862); 4 BL. COMM. 21; HALL, op. cit. supra note 5, at
58, 258, 288, 293; PERKINS, o %. cit. supra note 5, at 596; 2 ST'HEN, op. Cit. supra
note 7, at 183; Mueller, Criminal Theory: An Appraisal of Jerome Hall's "Studies
Vol. 1962: 2041
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Obviously, "wrong" and "know" need definition. Of course, for
the actor to know that what he is doing is wrong, his act must be wrong.
But how do we tell whether it is wrong? Responsibility, it is said, is
a moral question. 2 The best view (not universally enunciated, but
never excluded) is that an act is wrong when so adjudged by the moral
standards of the community.' 3 The acts charged in the cases in which
the insanity tests have been invoked have been wrong by this criterion.
What, then, does "know" mean? This is the crucial question."
The words "full understanding,""5 "conscious,"' 6 and "awareness'17
have been employed in elucidation, as have "appreciate," "comprehend
rationally," and "perceive."'" It also is insisted that the actor must
know that what he is doing is wrong in such a way that he is subject to
blame, morally culpable, that his mind is a guilty mind. 9
What makes his mind a guilty mind? There are two views: One
is that the actor must know that what he is doing is wrong and, knowing
this, must will to do it.20 According to this view, guilt is defiance
in Jurisprudence and Criminal Theory," 34 IND. L.J. 2o6, 216 (1959); Mueller,
The Teaching of Comparative Law in the Course on Criminal Law, x x J. LEGAL ED.
59, 62 (958).12 ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949-1953, REPORT paras. 281-85,
at 99-oo (1953). See Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666-67 (D.C. Cir.
1945).
"Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954); People v.
Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 332-40, 11o N.E. 945 (z9x5); HALL, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 479-80; PERKINS, op. Cit. supra note 5, at 748; SNYDER, op. cit. supra note 5, at
33; Mueller, On Common Law Men Rea, 42 MINN. L. REV. 1043, io58-61 (1958).
14 Mueller, id. at 1043, xo6o.
"State v. Strasburg, 6o Wash. io6, 1xo Pac. 102o, 1025 (191o).
"
8People v. Gilberg, 197 Cal- 306, 240 Pac. 1000, 1003-0 4. (1925); Tenement
House Dep't v. McDevitt, 2z5 N.Y. 16o, %68, 1o9 N.E. 88 (1915).
'United States v. Dotterwiech, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (-943).
" HALL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 482.
19Morssette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 25o-5i (2952); Durham v. United
States, 214 F.zd 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665,
666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1945); State v. Cumberworth, 69 Ohio App. 239, 43 N.E.2d 5o,
512-13 (.94.); HALL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 93; HALL, op. cit. supra note 5, at
258; MORELAND, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 27z n.6 (1952); Douglas, The Durham
Rule: -l Meeting Ground for Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 41 IOWA L. REV. 485, 490
(1956) ; Levitt, The Origin of the Doctrine of Men Rea, 17 ILL. L. REV. 1i7, 127,
131, 135, 136 (1922); Mueller, Criminal Law and Administration, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV.
83, 88 (1959) ; Mueller, The Teaching of Compqrative Law in the Course on Criminal
Law, Ix J. LEGAL ED. 59, 62 (1958); Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV..974, 980,
987, 989, 1ooS, 1017 (1931); Turner, The-Mental Element in Crimes at Common
Law, 6.CAMB. L.J. 31, 34-35 (1936).
S" Stat.e.v. Brandon, 53 N.C. 463, 467 ($62).
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of the.moral standards of the community; if the actor, knowing that his
act violates these standards, wills to do it, his mind is a guilty mind.
The other view is that more than this is necessary. There is a theory
that an offender who knows what he does, knows that it is wrong (and
also legally punishable), and coolly and carefully prepares what he
does, can and does control his actions right up to the moment of
commission. However, if because of a mental disease or defect the
offender has no sense of guilt (defined as "a self-reproaching -atti-
tude"),21 he is not criminally responsible.2 It has been asserted that
the Durham rule is grounded on this theory; that, according to this
rule, "an accused could know the nature and quality of his act, know
that it was wrong, have* the will power to restrain his act, and yet
[commit] . . . homicide with criminal impunity."23 In other con-
nections, the judges have talked about a "sense of responsibility,124 the
actor's knowing that what he is doing "deserves punishment,"25 and the
"mental power sufficient to apply that knowledge to his own case, and to
know that, if he does the act, he will do wrong.... , This second
view, hence, is that guilt is more than defiance of the moral standards
of the community. To have a guilty mind, the actor, knowing that his
'
1 ZILBOORc, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND PUNIStIMENT 5o
2 People v. Irwin, x66 Misc. 751, 4 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1938); ROYAL
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949-1953, REPORT para. 314, at 11o (1953) i
GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 90 (1952); MARTIN, BREAK
DOWN THE WALLS 259 (1954) REINHARDT, SEX PERVERSIONS AND SEX CRIMES 12-
13 (1957)5 WERTHAM, op. cit. supra note 3, at 125 ZILBOORm, op. cit. supra note
2x, at 97. Quite likely a man who does any of the acts involved in the cases in which
the insanity plea is made knows what he is doing, and wills to do it, and knows that
it is regarded as morally wrong by the community and that it is punishable by law.
Mueller, supra note 13, at io6o n.49. It is control before the moment the act is done
that counts i at the immediate moment of commission, perhaps nobody has control of
what he does. SNYDER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 317.
8 Flowers v. State, 139 N.E.zd 185, 194 (Ind. x956). Though it has repeatedly
been called a volition test (and certainly, according to it, if mental disease or defect
incapacitating the actor to know that what he is doing is wrong does incapacitate him
to will to do it, the actor is rnot responsible), M'Naghten has always adumbrated the
notion that even if the actor does will to do what he does, he is not responsible if,
because of mental disease or defect, he does not know that it is wrong. See note 9
sutra.
"Ridge v. State, 229- Pac. 649, 650 (Okla. Crim. App. 1924).
2 People v. McCarthy, 115 Cal. 255, 46 Pac. 1073, 1075 (1896). (Emphasis
added.)
"Commonwealth v! Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 5oo, 5oz (z844). (Emphasis
added.)
VOL. 1962: 204]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
act violates these standards, must will to do it and, in addition, must
recognize that he deserves to be punished--i.e., he must have a sense
of personal guilt.2 7
Thus, it is possible to summarize the essentials of criminal responsi-
bility in three different ways, as follows:
(.) The act must be wrong, and the actor must know what he is
doing and must will to do it (he cannot will to do it unless he
knows what he is doing i but, of course, he can know what he is doing
without willing to do it);
(2) In addition to the elements of (i), the actor must know that
his act is wrong;
(3) In addition to the elements of (i) and (2), the actor must have
sense of personal guilt.
However, it seems that there is some question as to which elements are
really indispensable to criminal responsibility. Though the elements
of (i) certainly are essential, it is less dear whether there must be
knowledge that the act is wrong (there can be knowledge that the
act is wrong without there being a sense of personal guilt) or a sense of
personal guilt (there must be knowledge that the act is wrong for such
to exist) in addition to the elements of (i)-i.e., in addition to volition.
B. Is a Sense of Personal Guilt or Knowledge that the Act is Wrong
an Essential to Criminal Responsibility?
In examining this question, it must be pointed out at the outset that
the commission of a criminal act does not necessarily import a mental
disease or defect.2 Criminal responsibility pertains to both mentally
normal and mentally abnormal actors and, consequently, must be ex-
amined in relation to both.
i. The mentally normal actor
It is undeniable that men without mental disease or defect who
commit criminal acts with no sense of personal guilt may be criminally
responsible and hence legally liable. Those morally depraved, " with
character disorder,30 have been mentioned. It is, to be" sure, contended
"T HALL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 93-104.
,GLrrMACHER & WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 22, at 26, 87-88, 901 385-90.
"People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 340, nxo N.E. 945, 949-5o (915)..
0 United States v. Smith, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 17 C.M.R. 314, 324 (1954). Mention
has been made also of "moral anomaly." GAROFALO, CRIMINOLOGY 85, 96 (Millar
trail. 1914).
[YqI. t96z: z04
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that there is no "person not subnormal and otherwise intact in mental
powers, who shows himself devoid of moral feeling."31 But inquiry
need not bog down in this argument. There are clear cases. A man
may have no sense of personal guilt not because of mental disease or
defect, but because of different culture, philosophy, or religious con-
viction. The man who kills under the delusion that he is commanded
by God to kill may be mentally diseased or defective; but the polyg-
amist by religious conviction is not, and he has no sense of personal
guilt-he has rather a sense of self-approval, notwithstanding that he
knows exactly what he does, does it deliberately, and is well aware that
other people generally consider his act to be morally wrong 2 The man
who kills another to prevent the debauchery of a female member of his
family may be as devoid of mental disease or defect as he is of a sense
of his own guilt.33 Then, there is
the counter-mores group. These are the stubbornly tenacious individuals
who consistently flout society in one way or another. They are a very difficult
group to handle effectively by law. They are made up largely of idealists,
dissidents, and malcontents. They are to be found in large numbers among
the conscientious objectors and the revolutionists. Psychologically they are
heterogeneous in make-up; some are wise and strong men, ... while many
are neurotic individuals attempting to solve basic conflicts.34
Those who are wise and strong men are certainly not mentally diseased
or defective; but they too commit criminal acts in furtherance of their
cause without any sense of personal guilt.
A hypothetical case will round out inquiry on this point. It is
familiar learning that just as mental disease or defect may negate a
mentally abnormal actor's knowledge of his act and hence his will to act,
or though not negating his knowledge may negate his will, so mistake
8 HALL, op. Cit. supra note 4, at 478, quoting William Healy.
"'Long v. State, i92 Ind. 524, 527-29, 137 N.E. 49, 50 (1922); People v.
Schmidt, 2 6 N.Y. 324, 340, 11o N.E. 945, 950 (1915) ; HALL, Op. cit. suara note 4,
at 93-104; PERKINS, op. cit. supra note 5, at 721, 8365 SNYDER, op. cit. sutra note 5, at
298, 313. Homosexuals have among themselves no sense of guilt about their practices
though they do about disloyalties inter se. REINHARIYr, SEX PERVxsSIONS AND SEX
CRIMES passim (1957). But the ancient Greeks, highly civilized and not mentally
diseased or defective, had no sense of guilt about homosexuality. Thus, it is plain
that sense of guilt can be negated by something other than, as well as, mental disease
or defect, even with respect to behavior usually today associated with mental ab-
normality.
" SNYDER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 286, citing People v. Cook, 39 Mich. 236
(1878).
"' GUT rMACHER & WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 395 (1952).
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of fact by or coercion of a mentally normal actor may have the same
effect. For example, if a man takes another's property really thinking
it is his own, he is neither criminally responsible nor legally. liable.
Suppose,- though, that the taker does know the thing he takes'belongs
to another. If there were some implied consent from actions of the
owner or some permissive local custom, the taker would be neither
criminally responsible nor legally liable.35 Suppose, however, he admits
that he knew what he was doing, that he did it deliberately, and that
he knew it was regarded generally by other people as morally wrong,
but asserts (and we believe him) that he thought it was not wrong for
him to do it and that he had no sense of personal guilt in doing it.
That he is not merely legally liable, but criminally responsible is hardly
disputable.
But what about the mentally normal actor's knowledge that his act
is wrong? This is a more difficult question, and it is confused by
the assumption that if an act is wrong by the moral standards of the
community, the only explanation of anybody's not knowing it is wrong
is that he is mentally diseased or defective; 36 a mentally normal person
who does such an act must know it is wrong. This assumption appears
to be sound as to people who have been brought up in the community
or have been in it for some time, but is false as to strangers within the
gates for but a short time. Take the case of "toting." A man from a
place where "toting" is customary, lately arrived at a place where one
may not "tote." If he is charged with larceny, a lawyer would ordinarily
say that the question is not whether the defendant knew what he did
was wrong, but one of mistake of fact: if the actor believed in good
faith that the custom of the place from. which he came prevailed also
in the place to which he had come, he did not know what he was
doing in that he did not know he was depriving the owner of anything
without his consent and, hence, had no intention to steal. Whether or
not this theory gets the defendant off the hook of legal liability, and
whether these facts show that an actor who knows what he is doing and
wills to do it but does not know it is wrong is or is not criminally re-
sponsible, the case does show that a mentally normal actor may not know
that his act is wrong.
In a much discussed recent case,"* the 'defendant had taken some
:' SNYDER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 296-98.
-"
8 Knights v. State, 58 Neb. 2z5, 228-29, 78 N.W. 5o8, 509 (1899).
" Mueller, supra note 13, at io6o n.49.
saMorissette v. United States, 341 U.S. 246 (195.).
[VoL 1962: 204
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
property, thinking on reasonable grounds and in good faith that the
owner had abandoned it. Under the rubric of mens rea, the question- of
criminal responsibility was raised. In considering this case, the first
question was: Just what was the question concerning criminal responsi-
bility? The act must be wrong for the actor to be criminally responsible,
and if it was not, he could not know that it was wrong. But was the
defendant's act morally wrong by relevant standards? This seems to
have been the question-not whether the actor must have known that
his act was wrong. Let us suppose that the defendant's act was morally
wrong by prevailing standards-a rather farfetched supposition, to be
sure, but let us make it; and let us suppose further that the defendant
did not know this-a rather far-fetched supposition too, if the act was
wrong by these standards, but let us make it. We then can ask: Would
the fact that the defendant did not know his act was wrong have negated
his criminal responsibility? It seems that the answer cannot be other
than that it would not.
At this point, let us consider the following case: an Oriental sailor
is arrested in one of our ports on a "morals" charge. His counsel
concedes that the defendant knew what he was doing, did it deliberately,
and before and at the time of the act was not and is not now mentally
diseased or defective; but he states (and we are sure he is telling the
truth) that what the defendant did is not regarded as immoral where
he comes from and he had no knowledge that it is regarded as immoral
here. Counsel then argues that defendant should not be held criminally
liable because this presumes his criminal responsibility, and he is not
criminally responsible because he did not know that what he was doing
was wrong. The questions of whether that argument would be
accepted and whether it could rationally be accepted seem merely
rhetorical.
It is true that if the actor knows what he is doing and wills to do it,
the fact that he does not know it is wrong may be, and properly is,
considered in mitigation of penalty; but that does not mean that liability
is not imposed on the basis of criminal responsibility.3 9 A devout polyg-
amist newly come to this country, may not know that his conduct is
regarded as morally wrong here, and may have no sense of personal
guilt when he learns that it is; nevertheless, he certainly would be
considered criminally responsible, though his penalty might be miti-
gated. A communist newly come to this country, may be unaware that
" HALL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 93"-io4..
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certain acts are regarded as morally wrong here; but, if he committed
one of these acts his ignorance would certainly negate neither his legal
liability nor his criminal responsibility, and his penalty most likely
would not be mitigated.
From the foregoing considerations, it appears to be perfectly dear
that a sense of personal guilt is not an essential of criminal responsibility
if the actor is mentally normal. It appears also, though not quite so
dearly, that knowledge that the act is wrong is not an essential of
criminal responsibility if the actor is mentally normal. Clearly, how-
ever, the act must be wrong by the moral standards of the community
for criminal responsibility to e~xist. Moreover, the actor's knowledge of
certain facts-e.g., in the above hypothetical case, the fact that the
owner had not abandoned the property-is necessary for the act to be
morally wrong. However, the actor's knowledge that his act is thus
wrong is not essential to his criminal responsibility. Knowledge that
the act is wrong, especially that it is legally punishable, may be and
sometimes is made a prerequisite of legal liability, but this knowledge
is only a legal requirement, not something that is essential to criminal
responsibility.
2. The mentally abnormal actor
The mentally abnormal actor presents the nub of the question. It
is in determining his criminal responsibility that a sense of personal
guilt or knowledge that the act is wrong is deemed to be important.40
This seems odd, for, since neither is essential for the mentally normal
actor to be criminally responsible, why should either be essential for
the mentally abnormal actor to be criminally responsible? If all ele-
ments of criminal responsibility of a mentally normal actor are present
in a mentally abnormal actor, why is not the mentally abnormal actor
also criminally responsible? Mental disease or defect does not ipso
facto negate criminal responsibility.
It is plain that volition may be negated by mental disease or defect;
that volition may also be negated by other facts, and that if volition is
negated either way, th6 actor is not criminally responsible. Moreover,
it is plain that the actor's knowing what he is doing may be negated by
mental disease or defect or by other facts, and that if his knowing what
he'is doing is negated for any reason, his volition is negated and he is
not criminally responsible. In addition, it is plain that the actor's having
,. Sayre, supra note 1g, at ioiS; Turner, supra note x9, at 35.
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a sense of personal guilt or his knowing his act is wrong may be negated
by mental disease or defect or by other facts. Hence, the puzzling
question is: since a mentally normal actor's lack of a sense of personal
guilt or his not knowing that his act is wrong does not negate his
criminal responsibility, why do these factors negate the criminal re-
sponsibility of a mentally abnormal actor? Can it be that the essentials
of criminal responsibility are different when the actor is mentally ab-
normal from what they are when the actor is mentally normal?
Let us assume that when the issue of responsibility is raised by the
insanity plea, the question, granted that he did know what he was
doing, is not whether the defendant had a sense of personal guilt or
whether he knew that his act was wrong; it is his mental capacity or
incapacity to have a sense of personal guilt or to know that his act was
wrong. When this view is taken, what appears is that not a sense of
personal guilt or knowledge that the act was wrong, but rather mental
capacity for such a sense or such knowledge is essential to criminal
responsibility. Or, put another way, that want of a sense of personal
guilt or of knowledge that the act was wrong owing only to mental
disease or defect negates criminal responsibility. But why?
The answer is found in the cases. It is that if the actor has no sense
of personal guilt or does not know that his act is wrong because of mental
disease or defect, he does not have mental capacity to will to do what
he does; but, if the actor has no sense of personal guilt or does not know
that his act is wrong because of facts other than mental disease or defect
the actor has mental capacity to will to do what he does."' In other
words, want of a sense of personal guilt or of knowledge that the act
was wrong because of mental disease or defect shows that the actor did
not will to do what he did; want of either because of other facts does
not show that the actor did not will to do what he did. Hence, even
though the actor is mentally abnormal, neither a sense of personal guilt
nor knowledge that the act is wrong is of itself an essential of criminal
responsibility; want of either, owing to mental disease or defect is but
evidence negating volition. If this evidence is conclusive of want of
41 See cases and works cited, supra notes 7-9, 16, 23-27. Some of the opinions do
adumbrate the proposition that notwithstanding whether he does, in fact, will to do
what he does, the actor is not criminally responsible if because of mental disease or
defect he does not know that his act is wrong. However, the cases have neither
answered nor even squarely raised this question. The question of volition preponderates
in them all. The big argument has been and still remains whether mental disease or
defect negating knowledge that the act is wrong is the only kind of mental disease or
defect that negates volition.
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volition, a sense of personal guilt or knowledge that the act is wrong is,
in a manner of speaking, essential to criminal responsibility if the actor
i.s mentally abnormal; but, even so, the one or the other is essential
only because essential to Volition and volition is essential to criminal
responsibility.
- Thus, it appears that neither a sense of personal guilt nor knowledge
that the act is wrong is essential for a mentally abnormal actor to be
criminally responsible. There are, to be sure, tantalizing questions that
remain unanswered. For example: Is his want of knowledge that his
act was wrong owing to mental disease or defect conclusive proof that
the actor did not will to do'what he did or is it only rebuttable evidence?
Can mental dsease or defect that does not negate knowledge that the
act'is wrong in fact negate volition? If want of knowledge that the act
was wrong owing to mental disease or defect shows, conclusively or
rebuttably, that the actor did not will his act, why does not want of
knowledge that the act was wrong because of other facts show that a
mentally normal actor did not will to do what he did? Yet, whatever
the answers to these questions may be, it appears, nevertheless, that, if
the actor wills his act, he is criminally responsible, even though he is
mentally abnormal.
Taking account of all the foregoing considerations, is not the best,
and perhaps the most supported, conclusion the following? Whether
the actor is mentally normal or mentally abnormal, the essentials of
criminal responsibility (of mens rea) are: the act must be wrong by
the moral standards of the community; the actor must know what he,
is doing, and he must will to do it-i.e., his causal motions must be not
only voluntary, but also made recklessly or with intention to cause the
resulting harm. A sense of personal guilt or knowledge that the act
is wrong, or want of either whether because of mental disease or defect
or because of other facts, is relevant only as it bears one way or the other,
if at all, on the question of volition and as it bears, if at all, on the
upward or downward adjustment of penalty. If the actor wills his act,
criminal liability is properly imposable.
IV
IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
It has been said that: "The greatest problem that 'confronts the
ciiminal law as a social institution is the test of the responsibility of a
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person for his crime.... ."" "Certainly no one who has studied the
problem of mental disease in relation to criminal responsibility can be
content with either the present rules or their administration."' 3 Thus it
seems that the tests being used are not doing what they are supposed to
do well enough; consequently there is need of a better test or tests.
But what is a test of responsibility? What is it supposed to do?
It is a means by which to tell whether the prerequisites of responsibility
were in the actor's mind. A test of responsibility tells us that if this or
that was not in an actor's mind, he was not responsible. In telling us
that, it tells us that this or that is an essential of responsibility. How-
ever, this does not tell us what all the essentials are. How then can
we devise and administer any test or tests that will do a better job, unless
we have and consistently adhere to a clear concept of just what all the
essentials of responsibility are? Take the burden of proof, about which
there has been and is much argument. "Basically," it has been asserted,
"how the burden should be allocated is a matter of public poicy...."4'
Suppose the burden is allocated to the prosecution. Then the prosecu-
tion must prove that all the essentials of criminal responsibility were
present. If we do not know what all the essentials are, we cannot know
what the prosecution must prove nor can we tell, whatever it has proved,
whether it has sustained its burden. Suppose the burden is allocated to
the defense. Then the defense must prove that at least one of the
essentials of criminal responsibility was not present. If we do not know
what these essentials are, how can we tell whether the defense has pre-
vailed, whatever it has proved, even if it has proved it beyond a reason-
able doubt?
Some suggest that the concept of responsibility be discarded.45 In
reply it may be asked: if we do not know just what all the essentials of
responsibility are, how do we know just what it is suggested that we
discard? And how can the concept be discarded? The problem of
volition will not go away. "Even a dog distinguishes between being
stumbled over and being kicked."4 A snappy poke in his nose would
most likely elicit from the most determined determinist the emphatic
judgment, "Why, you did that deliberately, you .... ," even if he has
"BO, PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL LAW 14 (1955).
"' HALL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 486. See also DAvITF, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW
212-13 (1959).
44 WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH r03 (1956).
" Cf. HALL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 528, disagreeing with Dr. White.
40 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (188 ).
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just finished the most thorough demonstration of determinism; and his
judgment would most likely remain unchanged after he has had the
benefit of counsel of his peers and plenty of cooling time.
V
RESPONSIBILITY-A MORAL QUESTION
4 7
To impose criminal liability on the basis of the above conclusions
as to what the essentials of criminal responsibility are, is not to say that
liability is nonmoral.4 Rather, this concept of liability is grounded on
a moral foundation: the act must be wrong by the moral standards of
the community.-9 This requirement supplies criteria for answering the
question of whether the act is a harm, since the effect of human conduct
may or may not be a harm.' ° But answering this question is not enough.
There remains the question: granted he has done an act that is morally
wrong, what justifies the government's bringing force to bear on a
human being? Is it the personal wickedness of the harm-doer, or is it
his social dangerousness and the moral right of other members of the
community to have government protect them?"1 Since in our concept
of the source, nature, and measure of its powers, government has no just
powers to force retribution from offenders but only to protect the lives,
liberties, and properties of the citizenry,52 the answer appears to be that
it is the latter. Personal wickedness and its retributive deserts are
relevant only as they relate to social dangerousness and the need of
protection. The above conclusions as to the essentials of criminal
responsibility accord with this concept of government's just powers.
' See text supra note 12; GUrnMACHER & WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 22, at 447.
Cf. HALL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 146-70.
"This basic principle is in accord with modern views. "Mental disorders are
today viewed primarily as failures in the socio-adaptive capacity of the individual."
GurrMACHER & WEIHOFEN, op. Cit. Supra note 22, at 13. The socio-adaptive failures
of the mentally diseased and mentally defective persons who get into the criminal
courts and invoke the insanity plea are certainly failures in adapting to the moral
standards of the community.
" Cf. HALL, op. cit. wspra note 4, at 212-46; HALL, op. cit. sapra note 5, 16, 248-5o.
" Durham v. United States, 214. F.zd 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Holloway v.
United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Parsons v. State, 8 Ala. 577,
583-84, 2 So. 854, 858 (x886); GU'r'rMACHE. & WEIHOFEN, Op. cit. supra note 22,
at-4 4 HALL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 93-104; MORELAND, THE LAW OF HOMIcIDE
272 n.6 (1952); WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 44, at 146; Levitt, supra note x9, at
127; Sayre, supra note 29, at zoiS; Turner, supra note 19, at 34-35.
"'SNYDER, Justice by Means of State Law: Natural Rights, 26 BOOKLYN L. REV.
184, 193-97 (z96o).
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